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MARKET MAGIC OR MARKET MANAGEMENT?
Export and Fiscal Policy in a Region at War
Reginald Herbold Green
Introduction - Where Do The Divergences Lie?
On two basic points Professor Hawkins and I are in agreement. All Southern
African economies need to expand earned import capacity (the counterpart of 
exports) rapidly and, except for Angola, non-traditional exports even more 
rapidly. This is not because all need export led growth but rather because 
all need to avert either import constraint throttled or import financier 
dictated development. Second present mechanisms of external international 
transaction intervention, control and management are less efficient (and 
effective) than could be achieved, in some cases castastrophically so.
In those two areas there is a major gap between our views on how: by the 
market magic propounded by the 1987 World Development Report (World Bank) and 
illustrated by Hong Kong and - less purely - Singapore or the detailed, 
interventionist market management practiced by Taiwan, South Korea and Brazil. 
Greater exports and greater efficiency are needed - whether the latter is best 
served in the context of Southern Africa today by less intervention and more 
laissez faire is quite another matter.
On three issues our disagreement extends to substantive goals. Zimbabwe’s 
government borrowing requirement (including fixed investment) is wholly the 
result of war. Excess military expenditure plus revenue lost because that 
expenditure itself and the excess transport cost imposed by RSA and its 
bandidos armados reduce intermediate goods imports (especially to 
manufacturing) and thus import, sales and company tax are in sum equal to or 
greater than the entire deficit. There is no known case of a country fighting
a major war without a high borrowing requirement. To view - as Professor
Hawkins does - the deficit in abstraction from its war cause is totally 
unsound and ahistorical.
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Zambia's 1984 and 1985-87 Structural Adjustment Programmes were foredoomed - 
as the World Bank has said in virtually so many words. Neither provided a net 
inflow of foreign resources and both required - given the level of 
under-financing against the Bank’s minimum adequate targets - measures certain 
to rend the fabric of society and end the programmes. What is surprising is 
how long the 19 8 5 -8 7 effort survived.
Third, anyone who will believe after 1973-87 that national economies do not 
need shock absorbers in the form of public policy between them and the - 
manifestly imperfect and shock prone - world markets will believe a great 
deal. Anyone who will believe it in respect to the economies of Southern 
Africa will believe anything. WDR 1987 shows the most systematically 
interventionist poor economies - India and China - as the most stable and most 
able to speed up development over 1979-86. Similarly the sub-set of South 
countries which did best at protecting social and human conditions were also 
notably (or to neo-liberals notoriously) interventionist, e.g. South Korea and 
Tanzania (and outside WDR’s set - Botswana and 1980-87 Zimbabwe).
Exports - How To Break Through
If anything Professor Hawkins understates the depth and breadth of the need 
for non-traditional export expansion in Southern Africa. For example on 
optimistic estimates Tanzania could restore and raise traditional exports to 
$600-650 million with a 3 to ^  annual growth rate by the early 1990s versus a 
$1,500 million base and 5 to 6% annual growth rate for imports to run the 
present economy near capacity with 5 to 6% annual growth. Zambia by 2000 
needs to achieve doubled total exports while 75Í of its present exports vanish 
with the rundown of its mines. Only Angola - in the absence of war - would 
have an adequate export base and expansion from hydrocarbon growth and 
restoration of coffee, diamonds and iron ore.
Processed and manufactured exports - whether based on existing raw exports or 
new domestic resource based products - will have to play a large and growing 
role in this expansion. The standard way of achieving such manufactured 
export breakthroughs has been by building up industry behind protection and
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then using detailed, targeted state intervention (plus a neutrally or 
undervalued currency) to build export niches. Only Hong Kong and - to a 
degree - Singapore have used the alternative free trade route at this initial 
breakthrough stage. The UK, the USA, Imperial Germany, Japan, South Korea and 
Brazil all used protection and intervention. The commonest combination has 
been high home market profits on a protected market plus export incentives and 
low (marginal cost plus) pricing of exports. Import liberalisation has lagged 
long after export market establishment. Zimbabwe with its relatively 
undervalued currency, retention and revolving fund schemes and de facto export 
subsidies (e.g. on steel and via rail rates) is, perhaps not too coherently or 
efficiently, pursuing the standard route with some success.
Some Problems And Pointers
The first problem is that protection alone - even when an industrial base 
develops - is not enough to cause an export breakthrough. The prime case of 
the 1970s is all too near - RSA. An overvalued currency, a gold pillow and 
the high cost (even if low wage) of migrant de facto foreed labour prevented 
more than a regional export breakthrough and also blocked rapid, cost lowering 
domestic market growth. The regional market export breakthrough was,
however, vital - it accounted for over 25Í of 1970s and early 1980s 
manufactured output growth.
What does the historic record (and that of RSA) suggest for SADCC member 
States and SADCC’s trade sector?
a. rational (tariff and/or quota and/or licensing) protection;
b. joint producer/government identification of key export products and 
markets to promote;
c. export incentives (e.g. access to credit, pre-export import finance 
revolving funds, retention schemes);
d. movement to neutral or slightly undervalued exchange rates with managed
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floats (e.g. Zimbabwe, Tanzania) to reach them and to prevent 
re-emergence of overvaluation;
e. enterprise involvement in procedural formulation and monitoring and a 
reduction in the number of steps to get incentives/permits and the time 
for each but within a stronger analytical frame;
f. using this approach to the regional SADCC market to reduce extra regional 
import requirements and intra-regional unused capacity and as a means to 
gain experience toward subsequent global export marketing.
The last point can be crucial. If broad frame agreements with target 
imbalances (or balances) and target commodities can be negotiated with 
enterprise advice and operated by enterprise transactions (with the cited 
incentives), substantial import capacity/exports and production can be gained. 
If settlement of unexpected imbalances is negotiated and centred on raising 
the lagging exports, the dead-end of blocked balances (and restricted trade) 
can be averted. But not by "free trade" and "free convertibility" - no 
Finance Minister or Central Bank Governor in Southern Africa will write open 
ended cheques in hard currency - a fact both the Lusaka Declaration and the 
SADCC trade sector programme underline.
In short - exports, yes; enhanced public policy efficiency, yes - but by 
market management recognising the reality of war and of market imperfections 
not mystic faith in market magic.
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